The advantage of these proposals is double

The carbon tax is justified by the desire to change individual behaviours. It is difficult to challenge the principle and the tax lever is often simple and effective. However, he is modulating and targeting such a tax to be efficient and fair.

In the State, the carbon tax proposed, mainly on fuel, is not efficient for two reasons. For the more affluent households, it is too low (6 to 7 cents per litre) to have an effective impact. For the more modest households, the price of fuel already restricts their movement and an additional fee will be the first order on home-work journeys, difficult compressible. This fee appears as an additional tax on the less qualified employment and a brake to geographical mobility. This goes to the encontre of the employment policy, making mobility a key of the decline in the unemployment factor. For example, for a couple in a rural area which both spouses are working in a different municipality of their housing and paid the minimum wage, according to the Insee commune, each makes 80 kilometres a day. Leading, with a few approximations to a fuel consumption weekly for the household of about 70 litres. The tax would be a 200 to 300 Euro annual cost only for the home-work trips, which represents approximately 15 of the EPP of the couple...

In addition, it is difficult to use a tax aimed at behaviour change at the same time with redistributive designs. The redistribution of the tax to be fair, should know a large number of parameters (consumption of the vehicle, distance home-working, kind of sports or calm conduct, traffic conditions, etc.), often unknown to the public decision-maker. Simply a refund based on the survey of consumption (even certified) of fuel is unthinkable, as would encourage more rolling and, therefore, to consume more for greater compensation.

Finally, the tax to be neutral for the more modest households, reimbursement must integrate the opportunity cost of the tax as a rate of interest, in my opinion much higher than the savings rate. To illustrate, consider a median couple (net monthly income total of 2,400 euros approximately), with two children, who would be taxed 1,000 euros to 31 August, before the new school year. The refund will be made following January 15, after the holidays. The real cost to the household will be probably closer to that of the consumer credit (i.e. a rate of about 18) as that of savings (approximately 1.25 if we take the A booklet). Households will indeed need to borrow to maintain their consumption, while waiting for the refund.

To be fair, the State must not only redistribute equitably the tax between households, but also, for each household, integrate compensation that will be especially high household is modest. If one adds it to the costs of collection and redistribution, fiscal neutrality is ensured. If redistribution is theoretically possible, its implementation appears less, both should be private information.

After this finding of failure, how is it then possible to change behaviour at a lower cost By taxing! But limited ambition of such a tax to the behavior modification which peuvent evolve. Simply put, simply to tax people who, for a given journey, choose to consume more, either by their conduct, the choice of their vehicle. First, it is sufficient to extend the malus part (which may be modulated by some paramètres as the geographic area) of the device existing for people who choose a more polluting vehicle. Then, it would be possible to add a green component to fines of excess of vitesse. By taking, drivers show (unbeknownst to them of course) their taste to conduct rapid and expensive fuel. The tax could be high, the excess is important and that there is a high number of recurrences. It would be also possible to moderate tax depending on the degree of pollution: it is more costly to pollute more a day of peak ozone example. Similarly, it would be possible to tax recreation involving significant pollution, such as mechanical sports.

The advantage of these proposals is double. On the one hand, on other occasions, they showed their impact on behaviour. On the other hand, they build on existing devices and their implementation can be fast and requires no complex devices of redistribution. These proposals are simples, low-cost, quick to implement and can be adjusted if they prove ineffective. They also have the merit to be fair. And may be declined in other green measures such as isolation of the housing or the choice of clean vehicles when it will be sufficient.